The …xed rate tender is one of the main procedures used by central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. While academic research has largely dismissed the procedure owing to its tendency to encourage overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of England have continued using it. We investigate this apparent con ‡ict by considering an auction-theoretic setting with private information about declining marginal valuations. Since overbidding entails exposure risk, an equilibrium may exist even if bids are costless and the intended volume is pre-announced. In fact, the allotment quota may be strictly below one with certainty. Also with adaptive expectations, overbidding need not escalate. However, the resulting allocation is typically ine¢ cient. Empirical proxies of exposure risk are signi…cant in both euro and sterling operations. Our …ndings have implications, in particular, for the potential reintroduction of pro rata allotment in the main re…nancing operations of the Eurosystem.
Introduction
The …xed rate tender is one of the main procedures used by central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. In a routine application of this procedure, a central bank …rst announces its intention to provide a given amount of interbank liquidity against payment of the interest and delivery of eligible collateral. Market participants then submit "bids" that specify the amount of liquidity they wish to obtain. Finally, the central bank determines how much liquidity is allotted to each of the bidders. If all bids can be allotted in full, allotments correspond in size to individual bids. Typically, however, there is excess demand and bids must be allotted on a pro rata basis.
It is probably fair to say that academic research has largely dismissed the …xed rate tender because of its tendency to encourage strategic overbidding.
Indeed, the procedure cannot work in a complete-information setting when there is excess demand. For example, consider n = 10 bidders with a demand of i = 0:2 each when the amount of interbank liquidity to be provided is 1. If all bids are for the amounts that are genuinely required, each bidder obtains only q i = 0:1 after pro rata allotment. Therefore, bidders have an incentive to overbid. But bidders that expect competing bidders to overbid have an incentive to in ‡ate their own bids even more. Thus, expectations of overbidding are spiraling, and there is no equilibrium. Moreover, in reality, the …xed rate tender has not always performed to the satisfaction of all market participants. In particular, during a well-documented episode at the start of Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, levels of aggregate bids escalated out of all proportion to the amounts of liquidity to be provided.
As a consequence, the procedure was abandoned in June 2000. 1 Notwithstanding this experience, central banks such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE) have continued using the …xed rate tender. In the euro area, the …xed rate tender with pro rata allotment has been employed to absorb liquidity in …ne-tuning operations, to distribute funds provided through the US dollar term auction facility, and to allot EUR/CHF foreign exchange swaps. In the United Kingdom, the procedure has been used in the weekly open market operations and in …ne-tuning operations. Interestingly, the mechanism has tended to work quite smoothly in all these cases. Indeed, as Table 1 shows, the overbidding episode in the - Table 1 about hereeuro area, with a mean log bid-to-cover ratio of 2.92, is a rather exceptional case. 2 To investigate the apparent con ‡ict between theory and practice, and to better understand the determinants of the smooth operation of the procedure, we study the possibility of an equilibrium in a somewhat richer theoretical 1 See, e.g., Ayuso and Repullo (2001) , Breitung and Nautz (2001) , Ehrhart (2001) , and Oechssler (2003, 2006) . 2 The bid-to-cover ratio is the ratio of total bids to the "intended" volume of the operation. All logs are with respect to the natural base.
framework. Speci…cally, we assume that bidders have private information, possibly correlated, about their own marginal valuations functions. In this setting, overbidding entails exposure risk, i.e., the risk of receiving an overly large allotment. We show that the presence of exposure risk has important consequences for bidding behavior. 3 For example, in a liquidity-providing operation, a bidder that excessively in ‡ates its bid may receive a very large allotment if aggregate competing bids are signi…cantly below the level it expected. That bidder not only receives excess liquidity but is also obliged to deliver the corresponding amount of collateral. However, holding excess liquidity is costly, e.g., in terms of interest rate spreads. Moreover, the obligation to deliver collateral may entail high fees for securities lending if there is a shortage of eligible collateral after the tender. 4 Because overbidding entails exposure risk, we can show that an equilibrium is sustainable even if bids are costless and the intended volume of the operation is pre-announced. Intuitively, if there is a possibility of exposure risk, incentives to overbid remain limited provided that competitors are likewise expected not to overbid to an excessive extent. Using this observation, 3 A related exposure problem arises in the theory of multi-unit auctions. There, a bidder with increasing marginal valuations may end up making losses when competition is unexpectedly strong. See, e.g., Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) . 4 Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001) stress the possibility that bidders fear the scarcity of liquidity in the after-market. In the present example, exposure risk is essentially the mirror image of that e¤ect, capturing a scarcity of collateral in the after-market. the existence of an equilibrium follows from a standard existence theorem for Bayesian games. We also discuss extensions and welfare implications. Specifically, we consider an example of an equilibrium in which rationing occurs with certainty. Then, in a dynamic extension with adaptive expectations and myopic optimization, moderate overbidding factors are shown to return quickly to the equilibrium level. Finally, we prove that the …xed rate tender typically yields ine¢ cient allocations even if there is no failure to coordinate.
To test the empirical importance of exposure risk for bidding behavior in …xed rate tenders, we ran regressions of bid amounts in the weekly euro operations conducted between January 1999 and June 2000, and in the weekly sterling operations conducted between May 2006 and October 2008. Proxies of exposure risk prove to be signi…cant for both cases, con…rming our main hypothesis. However, exposure risks are less pronounced in the euro area than in the UK. Our interpretation of these …ndings is that, apparently, there was a mismatch between the collateral framework of the Eurosystem and its tender procedures during the considered period, while there was no such mismatch in the case of the BoE. We use our …ndings to comment on the potential reintroduction of …xed rate tenders with pro rata allotment in the main re…nancing operations of the Eurosystem.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we survey some recent uses of the …xed rate tender. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework. The existence theorem is stated and proved in Section 4. Section 5 contains an example which illustrates the possibility of rationing with probability one. A dynamic extension is considered in Section 6. Section 7 deals with the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation. The empirical test is conducted in Section 8. Section 9 reviews some related literature. Section 10 concludes. The Appendix contains technical proofs.
Recent uses of the …xed rate tender
This section surveys recent uses of the …xed rate tender in the euro area and in the UK. We focus on the …xed rate tender with pro rata allotment, in which potential bidders are informed in advance about the intended (maximum) volume of the operation or have at least a good idea of what it will be. Operations in which participants are noti…ed in advance that all bids will be allotted in full as used, e.g., by the Eurosystem from October 2008 in its main and longer-term re…nancing operations are not consistent with this de…nition, neither are operations in which the central bank provides little information prior to the operation regarding how it intends to allot liquidity, as conducted, for example, by the Swiss National Bank.
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Altogether, we …nd nine recent cases of the use of the …xed rate tender with pro rata allotment (cf. Table 1 ). These cases originate from the 5 See, e.g., Jordan and Kugler (2004). following six data series:
(1) Euro …ne-tuning operations. Between May 2003 and October 2008, the ECB conducted 32 of its …ne-tuning operations as …xed rate tenders with pro rata allotment. These operations were liquidity-absorbing. shows the development of the allotment quota. 6 An occurrence of excessive overbidding appears in the …gure as a very short bar. As can be seen, the performance of the pro rata allotment scheme was overall quite satisfactory in these operations. First, the interest rate was determined as the marginal rate of the simultaneous Federal Reserve auction. Second, there was a maximum bid limit, equal to 10 percent of the pre-announced amount of liquidity to be provided. Table 2 lists some key data for these operations. We note a clearly discernible - Table 2 about heredownward trend in the allotment quota. These weekly tenders o¤ered credit for two weeks. There was no explicit announcement prior to the tenders regarding the total amount of liquidity to be provided. Instead, the decision about the total allotment was based, without binding commitment, upon a benchmark allotment, which is the amount of interbank liquidity that allows counterparties, on aggregate, to smoothly ful…ll their reserve requirements. 7 In fact, on average during the episode, the ECB tended to allot amounts somewhat above the benchmark allotment. Counterparties were able to estimate the benchmark allotment reasonably well from information on the liquidity situation of the overnight 7 The formula for the calculation of the benchmark allotment can be found, e.g., in the Annex of European Central Bank (2002) . For a theoretical rationale of the benchmark allotment, see Ewerhart et al. (2009). market. The performance of the main re…nancing operations with pro rata allotment was unsatisfactory owing to a rising bid-to-cover ratio. Somewhat less than half of those operations were liquidity-providing, a small majority were liquidity-absorbing. These operations performed well. The examples show that an escalation of bids in a series of …xed rate tenders with pro rata allotment is by no means inevitable. In fact, excessive overbidding occurred in only one of the nine series. Before continuing the discussion of the evidence, we examine a theoretical model of the …xed rate tender.
The model
The central bank intends to distribute one unit of a perfectly divisible good at price p 0 0. There are n 2 bidders. Each bidder i = 1; :::; n is asked to submit a bid b i 0. The allotment to bidder i is then
where b i = P j6 =i b j denotes the aggregate competing bids of bidders j 6 = i.
bidder i observes i . The joint distribution of types is given by a density f ( 1 ; :::; n ). Thus, types may be correlated. We assume that v i (q i ; i ) is continuously di¤erentiable in (q i ; i ) with @v i =@q i < 0, as illustrated in Figure   3 . 9 Type i 's demand at p 0 is de…ned as the maximum quantity q i such that
In fact, to simplify the exposition, we assume that type i has a demand of just i . 10 We also assume that an individual bidder's demand - Figure Payo¤s for bidder i are given by
In Figure 3 , i (b i ; b i ; i ) corresponds to the signed area bordered by the vertical axis, the horizontal line at p 0 , the marginal valuation curve, and a vertical line at the allotment to bidder i.
A (pure) strategy for bidder i is a mapping i :
For a given pro…le f j (:)g j6 =i of strategies for bidders j 6 = i, expected payo¤s for a bidder i of type i resulting from a bid b i are given by
where
The …xed rate tender is modeled here as a game of incomplete information (cf. Harsanyi, 1967-68) . In line with the auction-theoretic literature pioneered by Vickrey (1961) , we search for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. In equilibrium, each bidder is deemed to correctly anticipate the strategies (i.e., the bid functions) chosen by the other bidders. Via the strategies, the uncertainty about types translates into uncertainty about the size of aggregate competing bids. Thereby, any bid determines a probability distribution for the allotment to the individual bidder. Each bidder then chooses its bid so as to maximize the expected payo¤s from this uncertain outcome.
We now discuss the optimal bid in the …xed rate tender. Bidding below demand is obviously strictly dominated. Indeed, the only case where demand reduction is (weakly) optimal is when an individual bidder's demand exceeds 
, then there will be rationing, yet the allotment to bidder i nevertheless weakly exceeds its demand. Finally, if
the allotment to bidder i after rationing falls short of its demand.
The …rst-order condition re ‡ects these cases and balances the likelihood of gains from receiving marginal units within demand against the likelihood of losses from receiving marginal units exceeding demand. For example, for a well-behaved distribution of b i that allows a density g i (:), the necessary …rst-order condition for an interior maximum is 
Equilibrium bidding
This section deals with the existence of an equilibrium in the …xed rate tender with a pre-announced intended volume. Intuitively, the crucial condition for an equilibrium to exist is to exclude the possibility of mutually reinforcing expectations of overbidding. To achieve this, bidders should …nd it in their interests to overbid only moderately when their competitors do the same. Thus, in equilibrium, the likelihood and potential detriment of a low demand realization should be important in view of the extent and potential detriment of expected excess demand.
Formally, choose parameters m and M , once and for all, such that m > 0 and maxf 1 ; :::; n g < M < 1. Consider a bidder i of type i . Let 11 As usual, fxg + = x if x 0, and fxg + = 0 if x < 0. 12 Of course, the derivative of the allotment rule is well-de…ned for b i 6 = 1 b i only.
assessment of the probability that total demand is bounded by M , while aggregate competing demand weakly exceeds m.
denote the excess demand expected by that bidder. Write " and , respectively, for the supremum of "(i; i ) and the in…-mum of (i; i ), taken across all bidders and type realizations. Finally, let s = minfj @v i @q i j : i = 1; :::; n; q i i g and S = maxfj 14 The following lemma is the key result driving the existence theorem.
. Assume that each bidder j 6 = i follows some strategy j (:) such that j j ( j ) j for all j . Then bidder i's best response i (:) exists and
The proof is in the Appendix. The lemma …nds conditions under which expectations of moderate overbidding induce likewise moderate overbidding.
Moderate means here using a factor of no more than , where is taken 13 To understand the intuitive role of the second constraint in the de…nition of (i; i ), note that b q i may be quite inelastic in b i when b i is small. E.g., for b i = 2 and b i = 0:1, a decrease of b i by 0:1 lowers b q i by merely 0:02. Therefore, the risk of low demand with b i too small may indeed matter little as a limiting factor to overbidding.
14 Note that the parameters s and S are well-de…ned and strictly positive. Indeed, @v i =@q i is continuous on compact areas de…ned by either q i i or i q i i =M .
from the interval [ ; ). Note that the upper bound increases in and s, and decreases in " and S. Thus, consistent with intuition, the range of non-escalating overbidding factors widens as exposure risk becomes more important in view of expected excess demand.
If < , then Lemma 1 implies existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium in the …xed rate tender. A mixed strategy for bidder i is here a probability
coincides with bidder i's type distribution. We arrive at the main theoretical result of this paper, a proof of which may be found in the Appendix.
s. Then the …xed rate tender with pro rata allotment allows a mixed Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, bidders overbid by a factor of at most 1=M , and the allotment quota never drops
Thus, provided that expected excess demand is low in view of exposure risk, the …xed rate tender with pro rata allotment allows an equilibrium even if bids are costless and the intended volume is pre-announced. 
Rationing with probability one
The following example illustrates the possibility of a Bayesian equilib- 15 As an illustration, let types be uniformly distributed, with all i exceeding 1=n by a small amount only. Then an equilibrium exists. ; +1 ] according to the density
where > 1. This bidder's marginal valuation for an allotment q i is given
There is a pure Nash equilibrium in which type i bids
Moreover, for any combination of bidder types, the allotment quota is strictly smaller than one.
16
In the example above, rationing occurs with probability one. Nevertheless, an equilibrium exists because marginal valuations fall quickly, and the probability of high types, that overbid to a greater degree, is comparatively low.
Notably, an equilibrium in which rationing occurs with certainty di¤ers structurally from an equilibrium in which with positive probability all bids are ful…lled. In the former, there is a coordination problem with respect to the 16 To verify these claims, assume that j ( j ) = j =(1 j ) for all j , where j 6 = i. Then, bidder j's bids are distributed on the interval [1; 2 ], so that any positive bid by bidder i engenders pro rata allotment. Hence, when bidding b i against type j , bidder i obtains the allotment b
. Bidder i's problem is strictly concave, and leads to the necessary and su¢ cient …rst-order condition R extent of overbidding. That is, the equilibrium strategies of all bidders may be scaled up by an arbitrary factor without a¤ecting the resulting allotments.
In an equilibrium in which with positive probability all bids are ful…lled, however, re-scaling of all bids does not in general lead to a new equilibrium. This is because the allotment changes in the case of bids where the bidder is uncertain as to whether they lead to rationing or not.
The potential indeterminacy of the equilibrium has implications in a repeated setting where expectations about bidding may depend on the outcome of earlier operations. The prevalent view in the literature is that the development of myopic and adaptive expectations is a consequence of the perceived non-existence of the equilibrium. A weakness of that interpretation, however, is that participants in a bidding race would be required to adhere to the hypothesis of, say, an unchanged allotment quota despite the recurrent empirical rejection of that hypothesis. In an alternative interpretation, suggested by Example 1, expectations in an overbidding episode are in fact rational, only the coordination along the linear trend is adaptive.
Dynamics
This section studies a dynamic extension of the model introduced in Section 3. Time = 0 ; 0 + 1; ::: is discrete and tenders are organized sequentially. At the beginning of each period , a new type vector ( 1 ( ); :::; n ( )) is drawn according to the density f ( 1 ; ::: n ). Thus, types are independent across periods, but possibly correlated within periods. In contrast to our assumptions made so far, bidders'expectations are not necessarily aligned.
Instead, we assume adaptive expectations, meaning that bidders expect in period + 1 that competitors will overbid to the same degree as in period . Moreover, bidders myopically choose their bids b i ( ) so as to maximize expected payo¤s in period . Proof. By assumption, bidder i expects that aggregate competing bids 
Hence, in analogy to inequality (23),
For a su¢ ciently small such that
, we obtain the desired contradiction. Finally, note that can be chosen independently of because ( ) is decreasing in the relevant domain.
Thus, myopic best responses to adaptive expectations may lead to a steady decline in overbidding factors to the level predicted for equilibrium strategies. The range of overbidding factors over which this type of convergence is obtainable clearly depends on the relative importance of expected excess demand and exposure risk, as discussed before. Nevertheless, Theorem 2 can be seen as an "optimistic" counterpart to Nautz and Oechssler's (2003) divergence prediction. 
Welfare
The …xed rate tender commonly results in an ine¢ cient allocation whenever bidders …nd it di¢ cult to coordinate their expectations. As we show in this section, however, the situation is not much better when bidders have equilibrium expectations. Intuitively, when there is a possibility of excess demand, the allotment for some bidder must fall short of demand with strictly positive probability. Since that bidder makes an optimal choice in equilibrium, the allotment must likewise exceed demand with strictly positive probability. In an e¢ cient allocation, however, the allotment never exceeds a bidder's demand.
Formally, let
denote the welfare associated with an ex-post allocation q = (q 1 ; :::; q n ) and a type vector = ( 1 ; :::; n ). Note that no welfare is associated with any fraction of the good potentially left with the central bank. An ex-post allocation q is feasible if q i 0 for all bidders i and P n i=1 q i 1. Given , an ex-post allocation q is e¢ cient if it maximizes W (:; ) under the feasibility constraint.
Theorem 3. Assume that P n i=1 i > 1 with strictly positive probability.
Then, in any equilibrium of the …xed rate tender, pure or mixed, the ex-post allocation will be ine¢ cient with strictly positive probability.
Proof. Consider …rst a pure Nash equilibrium f i (:)g i=1;:::;n . Denote by q ( ) = (q 1 ( ); :::; q n ( )) the ex-post allocation resulting from that equilibrium as a function of = ( 1 ; :::; n ). To provoke a contradiction, assume that q ( ) is e¢ cient with probability one. Since individual allotments exceeding demand are ine¢ cient, v i (q i ( ); i ) p 0 with probability one, for all i. Furthermore, since there is a possibility of excess demand, there must be some bidder i such that v i (q i ( ); i ) > p 0 with strictly positive probability.
However, from the optimality of i ( i ),
which is the desired contradiction. Thus, any pure Nash equilibrium is inef…cient. In a mixed equilibrium = ( 1 ; :::; n ), the ex-post allocation q (b)
depends directly on b = (b 1 ; :::; b n ). As above, there is then a bidder i such that v i (q i (b); i ) p 0 with probability one and v i (q i (b); i ) > p 0 with strictly positive probability. Denote by
the mixed strategy that increases all bids in i uniformly by a factor > 1. Optimality of i implies
Since in equilibrium, b i > 0 with probability one, the assertion follows as above.
Thus, when there is a positive probability that aggregate demand exceeds supply, then the allocation implemented through the …xed rate tender will be ine¢ cient even with equilibrium expectations.
Empirical test
To assess the practical importance of exposure risk for bidding behavior in …xed rate tenders, we use data on liquidity-providing operations conducted The test is based on the following reduced-form model of bidding behavior. The endogenous variable is the log of total bids b t submitted in tender t, where t = 1; 2; 3,... counts the weekly tenders in chronological order.
In this speci…cation, a t and b a t 1 are the intended volume and the previous allotment, respectively. 18 To take account of the two-week maturity in the euro area, we include two lagged variables of bids, b t 1 and b t 2 . The interest rate applied by the central bank in the tender is denoted by r. Arbitrage possibilities are proxied by the spread between the unsecured rate and the tender rate, ( r) t , where the unsecured rate corresponds to the twoweek EONIA swap rate for the euro area and to the one-week LIBOR for the UK, respectively. 19 The hypothesis of exposure risk is operationalized by the spread between unsecured and secured rates, ( ) t , where the secured rate is the ECB's market repo rate for the euro area and the one-week general collateral rate for the UK, respectively.
20
The time series for the BoE was split into operations that settled on or before August 2, 2007, and operations that settled on or after August 9, 2007. We refer to the former as the pre-crisis sample, and to the latter as the crisis sample. The model has been estimated by ordinary least squares for the three samples, i.e., ECB, BoE pre-crisis, and BoE crisis. Table 3 -Table 3 about heresummarizes the results of the regressions.
The left-hand column shows the regression for the Eurosystem operations.
18 As a proxy for the intended volume in the euro area, we use the benchmark allotment at the announcement date of the tender. Cf. Section 2.
19 EONIA = euro overnight index average; LIBOR = London interbank o¤ered rate. 20 For the euro area, we use the one-week repo spread, for which the longest time series is available (settlement not before April 21, 1999). However, the results are almost identical for the two-week repo.
Consistent with …ndings in prior contributions, arbitrage possibilities had a strong in ‡uence on bids in the euro area. Indeed, the coe¢ cient of the spread ( r) t is highly signi…cant and positive. The time trend is also signi…cant and positive. 21 The new element here is the regressor for exposure risk. Its coe¢ cient is highly signi…cant and negative, as predicted by the theoretical analysis.
The regression results for the BoE during the pre-crisis period are shown in the middle column. While the coe¢ cient for arbitrage is positive, it is not signi…cant. Moreover, the trend is weakly signi…cant, but negative. In sum, this suggests that neither the arbitrage hypothesis nor the rationing hypothesis had a strong role in the pre-crisis sterling auctions. There is, however, a signi…cant and strongly negative e¤ect of exposure risk. In economic terms, an increase in ( ) t of, say, 5 basis points would lower total bids by 23.0 percent in the BoE pre-crisis sample, compared with 4.4 percent in the Eurosystem sample.
Finally, in the right-hand column, the table shows the coe¢ cients for the BoE during the crisis. The intended volume is signi…cant, potentially because bidders became more responsive to information after August 2007.
More importantly for our present analysis, the coe¢ cient for exposure risk 21 The usual interpretation of the time trend is that it captures the adaptive response to rationing, see Nautz and Oechssler (2006) . is again highly signi…cant and negative. The somewhat smaller coe¢ cient for exposure risk, compared with the pre-crisis period, might re ‡ect the fact that the relative scarcity of cash and high-quality collateral became more balanced during the crisis. That interpretation would also be consistent with the signi…cant arbitrage coe¢ cient. In sum, we …nd that exposure risk has been a signi…cant determinant of bidding behavior in all three samples.
The results of the regressions are consistent with anecdotal evidence on central bank collateral in euro and sterling markets. In the euro area, eligibility criteria for collateral have traditionally been broad. In fact, the …rst mention of a scarcity of collateral came at a time when banks in some euro area countries felt at a disadvantage during the peak of the overbidding episode. 22 The situation was very di¤erent in sterling markets. Indeed, the largest fraction of collateral used in sterling operations was gilts (i.e., UK government bonds), and these were, typically, not owned outright by the bidders, i.e., by banks and building societies, but were borrowed through securities lending transactions from the ultimate holders of gilt securities, namely pension funds and insurance companies. Therefore, when the bidto-cover ratio happened to be unexpectedly low, bidders with insu¢ cient collateral were indeed forced to go in search of more. In the remainder of this section, we discuss informally the performance of the …xed rate tender in the other six cases (cf. Table 1 ). Consider …rst the three samples in which operations withdrew liquidity from the market, i.e., the …ne-tuning euro operations as well as the liquidity-absorbing weekly and …ne-tuning sterling operations. The exposure risk in these operations di¤ered from the exposure risk in the liquidity-providing operations discussed above. If a bidder receives an excessive allotment in a liquidity-absorbing operation, it has an unexpected out ‡ow of liquidity. To compensate, the bidder must then either borrow in the market or have recourse to the central bank's lending facility.
24 Typically, both options will be costly in terms of the interest rate spread. More critically, credit limits may be exhausted in the market, and the bidder may also sustain a reputational damage from seeking additional credit. Finally, it has been suggested that not only in the US but also in Europe, there may be a stigma attached to the use of the central bank facility. Therefore, even if protected by anonymity, the bidder might still be exposed to rumors and insinuations. We conclude that receiving an oversized allotment in a liquidity-absorbing operation is potentially even more harmful than receiving an oversized allotment in a liquidity-providing operation. In particular, this would explain the quite satisfactory performance of the …xed rate tender in these three examples, all of which have very low mean log bid-to-cover ratios.
Next, we turn to the BoE's liquidity-providing …ne-tuning operations.
On the one hand, operations in that sample tend to exhibit a somewhat higher mean log bid-to-cover ratio than their liquidity-absorbing counterparts, which is consistent with the factors discussed above. On the other hand, their better performance compared with the BoE's weekly liquidityproviding tenders might be related to the fact that reserve account holders in the UK had some ‡exibility with regard to the ful…llment of their reserve requirements, which should have lowered demand in the …ne-tuning operations.
Regarding foreign exchange swap operations, Figure 2 shows that in contrast to the other examples, the liquidity policy for these operations was biased towards excess supply, which explains the very low mean log bid-tocover ratio of -0.73. During the short period with excess demand, however, the …xed rate tender generated a rather special situation. Speci…cally, if a bidder received an oversized allotment, it would have a large Swiss franc liquidity in ‡ow as well as a large euro liquidity out ‡ow. The exposure risk associated with the liquidity out ‡ow might have contributed to the relatively swift decline in total bids after the peak of the overbidding period.
Finally, the US dollar tender was similar to an ordinary liquidity-providing Eurosystem operation in terms of exposure risk. That is to say, exposure risk was probably not very pronounced owing to the relatively broad de…nition of eligible collateral. This view is consistent with the downward trend in the allotment quota. Indeed, our results suggest that even lower quotas might have been possible if these operations had continued in an unchanged market environment.
Related literature
Our main theoretical result is a robust condition for equilibrium existence when the intended volume of the operation is pre-announced and there are no costs of bidding. To the best of our knowledge, this result is new in the literature. Ayuso and Repullo (2003) compares the …xed rate tender with the uniform-price tender, stressing the non-existence result and collateral constraints on bids. Thus, it appears that the case considered in this paper is not covered by the existing literature. 
Conclusion
Central banks are fond of the …xed rate tender because it conveys monetary policy signals to the market usually with very little noise. Pro rata allotment is applied in these tenders when the total of bids received exceeds the total amount that the central bank intends to provide. In the present paper, we argue that exposure risk is a critical determinant of bidding behavior in …xed rate tenders. Owing to exposure risk, an equilibrium exists even when bids are costless and the intended volume of the operation is preannounced. In this equilibrium, the extent of overbidding is limited, and there is a bound below which the allotment quota never falls. We also …nd conditions under which temporarily elevated overbidding factors will, with adaptive expectations, decline to the levels predicted for the equilibrium. In particular, this suggests a rationale for the continued use of the …xed rate tender by central banks such as the ECB and the BoE.
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By clarifying the role of exposure risk for bidding behavior in …xed rate tenders, our analysis allows the overbidding phenomenon in the Eurosystem operations to be put into a somewhat broader context. The comparison with the sterling market strongly suggests that an absence of exposure risk, owing to the market-friendly eligibility criteria for central bank collateral, was a critical factor in the escalation of bids in the euro area. In particular, our …ndings suggest that a potential reintroduction of the …xed rate tender with pro rata allotment in the main re…nancing operations of the Eurosystem would presuppose a substantial review of the existing collateral framework.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall from the discussion of the optimal bid that i (0) = 0, and i ( i ) i for all i . In particular, we may assume in the sequel that i > 0 and b i > 0. The …rst-order condition associated with a marginal decrease in b i is
where and rewrite (16) as
We claim that under the assumptions of the lemma, for b i > i , the lefthand side (LHS) of the …rst-order condition (18) exceeds the right-hand side (RHS). But then, lowering b i marginally would raise expected pro…ts. In fact, the continuous function i (:; i ) must then be strictly declining for b i > i .
Thus, an optimal bid exists and satis…es i ( i ) i . 
RHS. By the de…nition of S, we have
Thus,
where F i (:) is the conditional distribution of i = ( 1 ; :::; i 1 ; i+1 ; :::; n )
given i . payo¤s are given by U i ( 1 ; :::; n ; 1 ; :::; n ) = i ( i i ; P j6 =i j j ; i ). Glicksberg's theorem implies existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies in the restricted game provided that (R1) payo¤s are equicontinuous, and (R2) information is absolutely continuous. For details, see Milgrom and Weber (1985) , and note that our de…nition of a mixed strategy corresponds to their notion of a distributional strategy. Condition (R1) holds if the family of functions fU i (:; 1 ; :::; n )j i 2 [ i ; i ] for all ig is equicontinuous.
LHS.
Since payo¤s are continuous in actions, it su¢ ces to show that all functions k 7 ! U i ( 1 ; :::; n ; 1 ; :::; n ), keeping the other entries …xed, are piecewise di¤erentiable with a uniformly bounded derivative. There are several cases.
Consider …rst k 6 = i and k > 0. Then 
maps R + [ i ; i ] into itself. Intuitively, e i raises all bids b i < i to i , and lowers all bids b i > i to i . Using Lemma 1, one …nds that
where i = ( 1 ; :::; i 1 ; i+1 ; :::; n ). Consider, …nally, the mapping i : 
Hence, using that ( 1 ; :::; n ) is an equilibrium,
where i = ( 1 ; :::; i 1 ; i+1 ; :::; n ). Thus,
and there is indeed no pro…table deviation.
tenders. Journal of Finance 16, 8-37.
